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CONTRIBUTIONS, DISTRIBUTIONS, AND ASSUMPTION
OF LIABILITIES: CONFRONTING ECONOMIC REALITY
Karen C. Burke*
I. INTRODUCTION
To combat a relatively arcane international tax-shelter abuse, Congress recently amended sections 357 and 362 governing contributions of encumbered
property to a corporation.' The 1999 amendments were designed primarily to
shut down attempts to create artificial basis by manipulating the liability assumption rules. Under one form of this tax-shelter gambit, a tax-indifferent party
(e.g., a foreign corporation or tax-exempt entity) might cross-collateralize a
liability of $100 with three zero-basis assets (each worth $100) and transfer each
asset separately to three wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries, subject to the same
$100 liability.' Under a literal reading of the relevant statutory provisions, each
U.S. subsidiary would be deemed to assume the entire $100 liability and thus
would be entitled to increase the basis of the contributed property from zero to
$100, even though the transferor incurred no U.S. tax as a result of the liability
assumption.' Such transactions created duplicative or overstated basis in the
transferee's hands, thereby resulting in excessive depreciation or mismeasurement
4
of income.
Although it is far from clear that the targeted tax shelters were immune from
successful challenge under prior law, the recent statutory amendments were
intended to more accurately reflect the underlying economics of these corporate

*Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; Smith College, B.A.,
1972; Harvard University, M.A., 1975; Ph.D., 1979; Stanford Law School, J.D., 1982. The author
acknowledges generous research support from the University of San Diego School of Law.
'See Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 ("1999 Act"), Pub. L. No. 10636, § 3001(a)(1), (b), (d)(2)-(5), 113 Stat. 127, 181-84. Congress intended the amendments to apply
to transfers after October 18, 1998. Id. § 3001(e), 113 Stat. at 184. The legislation was projected to
raise revenue of $187 million over the period 1999-2008. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH
CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF S. 262, THE "MISCELLANEOUS TRADE AND TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1999," SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY THE SENATE COMM1ITEE ON FINANCE ON JANUARY 22,
1999,
at I (Comm. Print 1999).
2
See Dep't of Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals 138 (July 1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/Iibrary/ctswhite.pdf.
For an earlier description of the proposal, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG.,
DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET PRO-

POSAL 157-60 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereihafter FY1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION]. See also
Comments Regarding Liability Assumption Provisions in IRS Restructuring Bill, 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 127-10, In 14-16 (June 23, 1998) [hereinafterABA Comments].
3
See I.R.C. § 357(c) (defining gain attributable to liabilities in excess of basis); I.R.C. § 362(a)
(noting that basis is increased by transferor's gain recognized). Under this mechanical reading, the
obvious economic flaw is the failure to apportion the cross-collateralized liability among the assets
in a reasonable manner. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
4
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 10 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION].
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transactions.5 The amended liability assumption rules rely on a facts-and-circumstances test based on the parties' expectations concerning ultimate responsibility for payment of liabilities secured by contributed property.6 A transferor is
deemed to be relieved of a recourse liability encumbering contributed property
only if the transferee agrees to, and is expected to, satisfy the liability.' By
contrast, a nonrecourse liability is deemed to be assumed by the transferee
except to the extent that the transferor agrees to satisfy the liability and retains
other property securing the liability.8 In addition to redefining the meaning of an
assumption, the 1999 legislation modified the basis adjustment provisions of
section 362 to prevent inflation of the basis of contributed property. Even if
amended sections 357 and 362 adequately address concerns related to abusive
tax shelters, they will inevitably complicate a broad range of nonabusive transactions. Moreover, Congress suggested that Treasury consider extending the
amended liability assumption rules to other provisions of the Code. 9
This article offers a critical assessment of the recent amendments to the liability assumption rules of section 357 and corresponding basis provisions of section 362. Part I explores the divergence between the former liability assumption
rules and the "economic benefit" doctrine of the section 1001 regulations. Part II
focuses on the technical definition of assumption of recourse and nonrecourse
liabilities under amended section 357(d). Part III examines the corollary basis
provisions of section 362, as modified to reflect the section 357(d) liability
assumption rules. Part IV argues that by logical extension the amended liability
assumption rules could also apply to corporate distributions of encumbered property, an area overlooked by Congress. The conclusion suggests that Congress
should exercise caution in extending section 357(d) principles and reconsider the
approach of ad hoc anti-abuse measures.
II. FORMER LIABILITY ASSUMPTION RULES: MISGUIDED REFORM?
A. Overview
Under the nonrecognition provisions of section 351 (a), a transferor recognizes
no gain or loss when property is contributed to a controlled corporation solely in

5
See id;,. see generally Mark A. Banks-Golub, Recent Amendments to Code Sec. 357: Congress
Responds to "Artificial Basis Creation," 78 TAXES 19, 19-23 (May 2000); John A. Bogdanski,
Section 357(d)-Old Can, New Worms, 27 J. CORP. TAX'N 17, 17-28 (2000); Michael J. Kliegman &
Jeannette A. Martin, Whose Liability Is It Anyway? The Impact of Recent Amendments to Section
357, 91 J. TAX'N 341, 341-48 (1999); Lee Sheppard, Tinkering with Assumption of Liabilities, 84
TAX6 NOTES 1348, 1348-51 (Sept. 6, 1999).
See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
7
See I.R.C. § 357(d)(I)(A).
'See I.R.C. § 357(d)(l)(B), (d)(2).
9
See I.R.C. § 357(d)(3). In addition to the changes to section 357, the 1999 Act also struck the
reference to taking "subject to" liabilities from sections 351(h)(1), 358(d)(1), 368(a)(1)(C), and
368(a)(2)(B). Selective provisions outside subchapter C incorporate the section 357(d) definition of
assumption of liabilities. See I.R.C. § 103 1(d) (like-kind exchanges); I.R.C. § 584(h)(3) (transfers to
regulated investment companies).
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exchange for qualified stock." If the contributed property is subject to liabilities,
however, the transferor may recognize a limited amount of gain under section
357(c). The former liability assumption rules were administratively simple; they
arguably departed from economic reality, however, to the extent that they treated
a transferor as relieved of liabilities without any corresponding economic benefit. While purporting to remedy this defect, the revised liability assumption
rules unfortunately introduce additional complexity and uncertainty.
Section 357(a) provides that assumption of liabilities is not generally treated
as boot in nonrecognition exchanges but instead reduces the transferor's exchanged basis in qualified stock, as determined under section 358." In the case
of assumed liabilities in excess of the transferor's aggregate basis in the transferred property, however, section 357(c) provides an important exception to
nonrecognition treatment: such excess liabilities give rise to gain from a sale or3
2
exchange of the transferred property. Although the legislative history is sparse,
section 357(c) is widely perceived as performing two functions: (1) it provides a
mechanical backstop to the subjective rules of section 357(b) relating to assumption of liabilities for tax-avoidance purposes and (2) it prevents the creation of
negative basis under section 358.' 4
Prior to its amendment in 1999, former section 357(c) essentially treated a
transfer of property subject to excess liabilities as a deemed sale of such property for an amount equal to the underlying liabilities. 5 The deemed-sale rule of
former section 357(c) departed significantly, however, from the general principles of section 1001 applicable to liabilities assumed or taken subject to in
connection with an actual sale of property. The section 1001 regulations treat a
seller as relieved of recourse liabilities secured by property only if the purchaser
agrees to pay the liability (regardless of whether the seller is actually released
from the liability). 6 To avoid potential double-counting, a seller's amount real-

I°See I.R.C. § 35 1(a).
"See I.R.C. §§ 357(a), 358(a)(1), 358(d)(1). Enacted in 1939, the predecessor of section 357(a)
was intended to reverse the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Hendler that a transferee's
assumption of liabilities in connection with a corporate reorganization triggers gain to the transferor.
See Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 213(a), 53 Stat. 862, 870 (enacting section 112(k)); United
States
v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
' 2See I.R.C. § 357(c).
3
Section 357(c) was added by the 1954 Code. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A129-A131 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4267-69; S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 270 (1954), reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,4908. The legislative history suggests that Congress viewed section 357(c)
as functioning in a manner analogous to the recapture provisions. See S. REP. No. 83-1662, at 270,
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4908 (illustrating the operation of section 357(c)).
4
See, e.g., Colleen Martin, Note, Lessinger and Section 357(c): Why a Personal Guarantee
Should Result in Owen Taxes, 10 VA. TAX REV. 215, 217-19 (1990). By requiring immediate gain
recognition, section 357(c) prevents the transferor's exchanged basis in qualifying stock from being
reduced below zero under section 358. See George Cooper, Comment, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1352, 1358-60 (1962) (arguing that section 357(c) was enacted solely to prevent negative
basis).
5
See FY 1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION, supra note 2, at 158 (noting that "present law treats
the taxpayer as having sold the asset for an amount equal to the relieved liability").
6
See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1), -(a)(4)(ii).
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ized does not include unassumed recourse liabilities to which the transferred
property is subject. 7 By contrast, the section 1001 regulations treat a transfer of
property that secures a nonrecourse liability as relieving the transferor of the
liability, triggering gain equal to the excess of the nonrecourse liability over the
transferor's basis in the transferred property. 8
In comparison to section 1001, the deemed-sale rule of former section 357(c)
arguably failed to distinguish properly between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities. Treasury regulations interpreted former section 357(c) as requiring recognition of gain regardless of whether the transferor was economically relieved of a
recourse liability secured by contributed property. 9 Case law suggested that
economic benefit was irrelevant in determining whether a transferor should be
treated as relieved of recourse liabilities for purposes of triggering section 357(c)
gain.2" Although there was no clear definition of when property should be considered "transferred subject to a liability," section 357(c) apparently treated
recourse and nonrecourse liabilities alike. 2' Courts rejected taxpayers' arguments
that the "subject to" language of former section 357(c) should be read as referring exclusively to nonrecourse liabilities secured by the transferred property
and not assumed by the transferee.22
B. Economic Benefit Approach
The apparent conflict between the principles of sections 1001 and 357(c) led
some commentators to urge that the latter provision be clarified to apply only to
7

See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Zero Basis Hoax or Contingent Debt and Failureof Proof? Sorting
Out the Issues in the Lessinger Case, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 283, 303 (1994) (concluding that the unassumed
debt "would improperly double up the transferor's income"). For example, assume that A sells land
worth $200, subject to a recourse liability of $50, to B for $200 cash; B does not agree to pay the
debt. Because the debt is not treated as discharged for purposes of section 1001, A's amount realized
is only the $200 cash. If A were instead treated as receiving both the $200 cash and $50 discharge of
indebtedness, A's amount realized would be overstated.
'"See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i).
9
See Reg. § 1.357-2(a). The legislative history describes pre-1999 law as suggesting that it was
"not necessary to consider whether, as a practical matter, the transferor has been relieved of the
transferred liability." See FYI999 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION, supra note 2, at 159. But cf
Cummings, supra note 17, at 301 (explaining pre-1999 law in terms of the transferor's failure to
prove that contributed property was not transferred subject to liabilities).
20
See, e.g., Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 1I, 19 (1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.
1975) (noting that "there is no requirement in section 357(c)(1) that the transferor be relieved of
liability"); Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "section 357(c)'s
plain language makes no special provision for transfers not resulting in an economic benefit to the
transferor"). For an apparently contrary interpretation of section 357(c), see Easson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 963, rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961), and Jackson v.
Commissioner,708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983).
2
See I.R.C. § 357(c) (1994). By analogy to "wraparound mortgages," the transferee may be
treated as not having assumed a liability (or taken the property subject to a liability) that the
transferor agrees to pay. See, e.g., Prof l Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165, 179-81 (1987)
(permitting seller to exclude from amount realized any "subject to" liabilities which the seller agrees
to pay); see also Cummings, supra note 17, at 303-06.
22
See Owen, 881 F.2d at 836 (rejecting taxpayer's contention that "section 357(c)'s categories of
(1) assumed liabilities and (2) liabilities to which the transferred property is subject are mutually
exclusive"). The court noted that, under the taxpayer's argument, the "subject to" language of former
section 357(c) would be limited to "nonrecourse, unassumable liabilities." Id.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 2
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"liabilities treated as [an] amount realized under section 1001."23 The proposed
clarification was intended specifically to reverse authority requiring recognition
of section 357(c) gain when the transferor received no corresponding economic
benefit.24 Accordingly, recourse liabilities would be treated as assumed by the
transferee only to the extent that the transferor was economically relieved of
such liabilities." Liabilities not treated as assumed would be disregarded for
purposes of determining the amount of boot received and the transferor's basis
in qualifying stock.26
The section 1001 approach and the underlying economic benefit doctrine
derive from the Supreme Court's dicta in Crane v. Commissioner.27 In clarifying
the scope of the Crane rule, Commissioner v. Tufts indicated that symmetry
requires inclusion of nonrecourse liabilities in amount realized, regardless of the
fair market value of the underlying properly. 8 The rationale for triggering Tufts
gain upon a disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse liability is that the
transferor must account for the prior tax benefits arising from inclusion of debt
in basis when there is no longer any reason to treat the transferor as liable to
repay the debt.29 In the case of recourse liabilities, however, a disposition of the
property does not necessarily extinguish the transferor's personal liability; hence,
the amount realized under section 1001 generally includes only recourse liabilities that the purchaser agrees to pay.
Former section 357(c) may be viewed as establishing an administrative presumption that a transfer of property to a controlled corporation represents an
appropriate time to trigger gain recognition attributable to excess recourse
liabilities. Such treatment reflects the likelihood that a creditor will proceed first
against the transferred property securing the liability, even if the transferor is not
released from such liability. Because the subsequent transfer is merely a convenient occasion to require an accounting for the earlier tax-free receipt of borrowed funds, the economic benefit to the transferor on the contribution is
irrelevant. 30 Moreover, section 351 exchanges between corporations and their
shareholders pose special problems of relatedness that may justify a deemed
assumption rule analogous to former section 357(c). 3' As an economic matter,
2

See ABA Comments, supra note 2, $ 17.
'See id. (referring to the "uncertainty flowing from Owen and the [regulation's] imprecision").
25
See id. 121-23; H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 3301A(b) (1998) (proposing section 357(c)(4)(A)).
26
1n effect, unassumed recourse liabilities would be treated in the same manner as "excludible
liabilities," i.e., liabilities that would have given rise to a deduction if paid directly by the transferor.
See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2).
27331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947) (suggesting that relief of nonrecourse liabilities might not constitute
an amount realized if the transferor received no economic benefit).
"8See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (rejecting Crane's narrow "economic
benefit theory").
29
See William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949, 954 (1983) ("What is involved,
functionally, is simple basis accounting for the debt.").
3
See Charlotte Crane, Toward a Theory of the Corporate Tax Base: The Effect of a Corporate
Distribution of Encumbered Property to Shareholders, 44 TAX L. REV. 113, 122 n.30 (1988).
3
See Elliott Manning, The Issuer's Paper: Property or What? Zero Basis and Other Income Tax
Mysteries, 39 TAX L. REv. 159, 162 (1984) (suggesting the "relationship approach" in analyzing
contribution of a shareholder's note to a controlled corporation).
Tar Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 2
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such relatedness is likely to make it impossible to determine how the transferor
and transferee have allocated responsibility for payment of the debt.32
For example, assume that A transfers property with a zero basis and a fair
market value of $60, subject to a $50 recourse liability, to X in exchange for all
of X's stock; X does not formally assume the recourse liability. If A remains
personally liable for the debt, X should "pay" A the full unencumbered value of
the property; thus, A's X stock should be worth $60.11 A recognizes no gain
attributable to liabilities relieved, but A's built-in gain of $60 is fully preserved
in the X stock ($60 fair market value less zero basis). If X is expected to pay the
unassumed debt, however, A's X stock should logically be worth only the net
value of the transferred property ($10), and X should be treated as taking the
property subject to the $50 recourse liability. Accordingly, A recognizes section
357(c) gain of $50, and A's remaining built-in gain of $10 is preserved in the X
stock ($10 fair market value less zero basis). 4 If the transfer does not trigger
section 357(c) gain, however, $50 of A's built-in gain potentially disappears."
The difficulty of ascertaining the parties' subjective intent may help explain
judicial reluctance in the section 351 context to enter into a factual inquiry
concerning whether a bona fide assumption has taken place. 36 The desire to
avoid difficult problems of proof and complex retroactive adjustments may justify the deemed assumption rule of former section 357(c). While such a mechanical rule inevitably yields economically inaccurate results in certain cases, it
nevertheless permits simplified accounting for liabilities in connection with
section 351 contributions of encumbered property. As the tax-shelter abuses
demonstrate, however, anti-abuse measures may be required to prevent inten37
tional manipulation of such a simplifying rule.
C. Confusion in Case Law
The legislative history of the 1999 Act refers to Lessinger v. Commissioner38

32

See Cummings, supra note 17, at 302-03 (explaining the presumption of section 357(c) in terms
control relationship between the transferor and transferee).
of 3the
3
See 1 BORIS 1. BITTKER & JAMES S. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 3.0612], at 3-27 n.99 (7th ed. 2000). The unassumed liability should be disregarded
for purposes of determining A's basis in the X stock. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
34
Under section 358, A's basis in the X stock is zero (zero basis of contributed property increased
by $50 gain recognized and reduced by $50 liabilities assumed).
35
Consistent with the parties'-treatment of the recourse liability as not assumed by the transferee, A
should apparently be treated as receiving a constructive distribution of $50 when X eventually repays
the recourse liability. Alternatively, A could be required to recognize $50 of section 357(c) gain
retroactively. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
36
See ABA Comments, supra note 2, U 23-27.
37
For example, the partnership anti-abuse rules recognize that certain provisions of subchapter K
are intended to promote administrative convenience or other goals; to prevent tax-motivated manipulation of these simplifying rules, the section 701 regulations employ a proper-reflection-of-income
test. See Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3). Congress considered but did not enact proposals aimed at tightening
the tax avoidance test of section 357(b); see, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG.,
DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 199-201 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter FY2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION].
38872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989).
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and Peracchi v. Commissioner39 as contributing to uncertainty under former
section 357(c).° Neither case supports the conclusion, however, that former
section 357(c) was fundamentally flawed. In Lessinger and Peracchi,the parties
stipulated that the transferee corporation had assumed excess recourse liabilities
in connection with a contribution of encumbered property. Thus, the primary
issue was whether contribution of a shareholder's personal note in the amount of
such excess liabilities was sufficient to negate any section 357(c) gain. Not
surprisingly, the government rejected this assertion, relying on authority that an
obligor's own note has a zero basis.4'
Based on a circular reading-of sections 357(c) and 362, the Second Circuit
in
Lessinger held that the taxpayer did not recognize gain attributable to relief of
excess liabilities.12 While some commentators viewed the Lessinger outcome
sympathetically, a3 the Second Circuit's opinion was widely conceded to be indefensible as a matter of statutory interpretation." By contrast, the Ninth Circuit
majority in Peracchiexpressly held that the taxpayer had a basis in his own note
equal to its face value,4" potentially undermining the integrity of section 357(c).46
In a footnote, the majority sought belatedly to limit operation of its opinion to
47
ihe particular facts in Peracchi.
Far from resolving the zero-basis controversy,
the Peracchi majority extended an:open invitation to further litigation concerning proper valuation of a shareholder's own obligation.

39143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1998).
'See FY2000 BuDOET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION, supra note 37, at 198-99 (arguing that, as a result of

such uncertainty, "some taxpayers may be reluctant to engage in legitimate transactions or may
restructure them"). But see Seggerman Farms, Inc. v Commissioner, 308 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the notion of an "emerging equitable interpretation" of section 357(c) based on Lessinger
and Peraccchi;secondary liability as guarantors not sufficient to prevent section 357(c) gain).
4
See Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 662, 665 (1971); Rev. Rul. 1968-629, 1968-2 C.B. 154,
155.
42
While agreeing that the taxpayer had no basis in his own note, the Second Circuit in Lessinger
held that basis for purposes of section 357(c) had to be determined by reference to the basis of the
corporation, which arguably acquired the obligation with a fair-market-value basis. See 872 F.2d at
525-26.
43
See, e.g., Kenneth P. Brewer, The Zero Basis Hoax, 63 TAx NOTES 457, 458 (1994); J. Clifton
Fleming, A Second Look at the Zero Basis Hoax, 64 TAX NOTES 811, 812 (1994). But see George K.
Yin, Letter to the Editor, Was Lessinger Decided Correctly? More on Zero Basis, 65 TAX NoTs 131,
131 (1994) (suggesting that the argument for deferral is less persuasive if the Lessinger transaction is
viewed as a constructive distribution).
"See Cummings, supra note 17, at 287 ("As virtually all commentators have pointed out, the
Second Circuit's analysis is surely incorrect.").
45
Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski excused the taxpayer's admittedly "imperfect attention
to his obligations." 143 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1998). To determine the value (and hence basis) of
the shareholder's note, Judge Kozinski resorted to the convenient fiction of enforcement by a thirdparty creditor in the event of the.corporation's bankruptcy. Id. at 493. By contrast, the Tax Court
concluded that the corporation's enforcement of the note was "highly unrealistic." Peracchi v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2830, 2833, 1996 T.C.M. (RIA) T 96,191, at 1428.
46
The function of section 357(c) is not undermined if the transferee in fact pays the note to the
corporation. See I BITrKER & EuSrICE, supra note 33, 3.06[4][b], at 3-35.
'1143 F.3d at 494 n.15 ("[W]e limit our holding to cases where the note is in fact worth approximately its face value."); see also id. at 493 n.14 (noting that valuation depended on corporation's
exposure to "non-trivial risk of bankruptcy").
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 2
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The underlying premise of the government's zero-basis argument is that contribution of a related party's note is an inappropriate time to extend basis credit,
given uncertainty concerning eventual payment.4 8 For example, the partnership
regulations expressly apply an open-transaction approach with respect to partner
notes, deferring valuation of such notes until a subsequent disposition by the
partnership to a third party or principal payments by the partner who issued the
note. 49 Deferring the valuation event preserves an appropriate degree of skepticism toward a related party's promise to make future payments.50 It might have
been possible to avoid the uncertainty arising from the Lessinger and Peracchi
decisions if the government had better articulated the rationale for the zero-basis
argument. 5 While the recent legislative changes apparently moot the Lessingeri
Peracchi zero-basis controversy, they were clearly not intended to address this
problem.52 Instead, they were driven by the perceived need to address tax-shelter
abuses involving artificial basis creation.
III. REDEFINING ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIES
A. Overview
The 1999 Act left much of the existing statutory framework intact, but struck
the reference in section 357(a) to a transferee "acquir[ing] . . . property subject
to a liability. ' 53 Under current law, section 357(a) refers only to liabilities of the

transferor that are assumed by another party to the exchange.5 4 Likewise, excess
liabilities for purposes of section 357(c) are now defined as the sum of assumed
liabilities in excess of the total basis of contributed property. 5 Simultaneously,
Congress amended section 357(d) to provide a technical definition of "assump-

45
See Manning, supra note 31, at 193-95 (suggesting that contribution of a shareholder note should
be treated as open transaction because of relationship between transferor and transferee); Cummings,
supra note 17, at 315-19 (analyzing reasons for treating shareholder note as contingent debt).
4
9Thus, if a promissory note is contributed to a partnership by a partner who is the maker of such
note, the partner's capital account is increased only when there is a taxable disposition of the note by
the5 partnership or the partner makes principal payments on the note. See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
0n a disposition, the substitution of an independent creditor renders payment of the note sufficiently certain to permit the contributing partner's capital account to be increased by the amount of
the obligation. By contrast, the lack of such assurance helps to explain strict interpretation of section
357(c). See ABA Comments, supra note 2, 27 ("The strictness of most of the prior interpretations of
section
357(c) no doubt [has] stemmed from suspicions about who would pay the liabilities."). "
51
See Cummings, supra note 17, at 317 (noting that the zero-basis argument is only a shorthand
expression for the underlying problem, i.e., the related status of the parties). The zero-basis controversy may also illustrate the untoward consequences when appellate courts intervene in "a field beset
with invisible boomerangs." Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
52
See ABA Comments, supra note 2, 23 (noting need for a separate administrative or legislative
solution for zero-basis problem); Cummings, supra note 17, at 293-96 (discussing whether
shareholder's contribution of own note should be treated as separate transaction or "integrated" with
section 351 transaction to avoid section 357(c) gain).
53
See I.R.C. § 357(a) (1999).
5See I.R.C. § 357(a).
55
See I.R.C. § 357(c).
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tion."56 While acknowledging that "factual uncertainty" would remain, Congress
expected that the new provisions would "increase ... legal certainty" and reduce
the potential for abusive results that do not conform to economic reality. 7
B. Recourse Liabilities
Section 357(d) treats a recourse liability as having been assumed only if,
based on all the facts and circumstances, the transferee "has agreed to, and is
expected to, satisfy such liability" (or portion thereof), regardless of whether the
transferor has been relieved of the liability.58 For example, assume that A transfers property with a basis of zero and a fair market value of $100,000, subject to
a recourse liability of $20,000, to X in a section 351 transaction. Under prior
law, X would be deemed to assume the recourse liability, and A would recognize
$20,000 of section 357(c) gain. By contrast, under section 357(d)(1)(A), A is no
longer treated as relieved of the liability unless X agrees to, and is expected to,
satisfy such liability. Thus, a transfer of property subject to excess recourse
liabilities no longer triggers section 357(c) gain if the transferor remains solely
liable.59
In effect, section 357(d)(1)(A) codifies the economic benefit theory underlying the section 1001 regulations.' As a practical matter, it is no longer necessary
for shareholders to furnish their own obligations to offset excess recourse liabilities. Thus, section 357(d) should generally eliminate the Lessinger/Peracchi
zero-basis controversy. To avoid section 357(c) gain, the shareholder should
instead agree to indemnify the corporation to the extent of any unassumed excess recourse liabilities secured by the contributed property.6' The language of
section 357(d)(1)(A) is not identical, however, to the section 1001 rule with
respect to discharge of recourse indebtedness. The section 1001 regulations
require merely that the transferee agree to pay the underlying recourse liability,
while section 357(d) provides that the transferee must also be "expected to" pay
such liability.62
The expectation test gives rise to numerous ambiguities. 63 If the transferee

56

57See

I.R.C. § 357(d).
FY2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION, supra note 37, at 199.
See I.RC. § 357(d)(1)(A).
' 9By contrast, a nonrecourse liability encumbering contributed property continues to be treated as
assumed by the transferee, except as provided in section 357(d)(2). See I.R.C. § 357(d)(I)(B), (d)(2);
see also infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
6°Even without a statutory change, Treasury could have achieved a similar result by amending the
section 357 regulations to incorporate the economic benefit approach of section 1001.
6'The legislative history indicates that no assumption occurs if the transferor "remains solely liable
[for a recourse liability] without a right of contribution against the transferee" or "indemnifies the
transferee against the possibility of foreclosure." See FY1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION, supra
note
62 2, at 158.
The expectation test did not appear in the initial version of the legislation. See H.R. 2676, 105th
Cong. § 3301A(b) (1998) (proposing section 357(c)(4)(A)).
3
See Bogdanski, supra note 5, at 22-23 ("Even a cursory reading of the new language brings up
the obvious question of whose expectations are relevant. Expected by whom? The transferor, the
transferee, or both? What if their views differ?").
5
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agrees to satisfy a liability, the legislative history indicates that the transferee is
presumed to meet the expectation test, absent contrary facts.' If the expectations
of the transferor and transferee differ, it is not clear whose expectations should
control. Perhaps the expectations of third-party creditors should also be significant, although the statute apparently contemplates only an agreement between
the transferor and transferee.65 Often, subsequent events may occur that are
inconsistent with the parties' initial treatment of liabilities secured by contributed property. For example, responsibility for the debt may be allocated to one
party, even though another party eventually pays interest or principal.
Treasury has authority to issue regulations specifying basis and other consequences arising from subsequent transactions involving assumed liabilities, including payment of the liabilities.66 If the transferee corporation later pays a
recourse liability that was not treated as assumed under section 357(d), the
transferor should apparently be required either to recognize section 357(c) gain
retroactively or to report a section 301 distribution when the personal liability is
relieved.67 A deemed section 301 distribution, which triggers ordinary income to
the extent of available earnings and profits, may result in harsher tax consequences than retroactive gain recognition under section 357(c). Under sections
357 and 358, the transferor is permitted to recover basis before recognizing any
gain attributable to boot from liability, relief. Moreover, section 357(c) gain is
treated as gain from a sale or exchange of the underlying property.
Section 357(d)(1)(A) treats the transferor as retaining any recourse liabilities
secured by contributed property unless the transferee specifically agrees to satisfy such liabilities. The default rule of nonassumption may seem surprising,
particularly given the risk of deemed dividend treatment if the transferee later
satisfies the underlying liability.. Well-advised taxpayers will carefully monitor
any subsequent debt payments to ensure consistency with the parties' initial
treatment of the liability. By contrast, the deemed assumption rule of former
section 357 was arguably efficient to the extent the parties generally expected
that the underlying debt would be repaid from the property itself or from corporate earnings. Such efficiency was further enhanced by the ease with which
knowledgeable parties could structure transactions to avoid adverse consequences
from a deemed assumption-for example, by borrowing and contributing cash
to the corporation to offset excess recourse liabilities that otherwise would trigger section 357(c) gain.6"
'See

GENERAL EXt'LANATION, supra note 4, at 10.
By contrast, the section 752 regulations require that a creditor be aware of a partner's assumption of a partnership's obligation and be able to enforce directly the assuming partner's obligation.
See Reg. § 1.752- 1(d)(2). The creditworthiness of the transferor and transferee may also be relevant.
But see Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) (except in abusive situations, partners are generally deemed to discharge their obligations).
5

'See

67

GENERAL EXPLANATION,

supra note 4, at 10- 1l.

See Bogdanski, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that later payment may call into question the validity
of the parties' earlier agreement).
68
When a shareholder borrows outside the corporation and contributes the borrowed cash rather
than the shareholder's own note, the third-party transaction mitigates problems of valuation and
enforceability.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 2

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC REALITY

By imposing a facts-and-circumstances test, section 357(d) requires closer
attention to the related-party status of the transferor and transferee.69 Given the
nature of that relationship, however, it may be unrealistic to expect to ascertain
reliably the manner in which the parties have actually allocated the economic
burden of liabilities encumbering transferred property. By contrast, former section 357 was arguably intended precisely to avoid the need for such inquiry in
routine transactions. While section 357(d)(1)(A) is perhaps technically more
precise than the former liability assumption rule, it is likely to give rise to
increased uncertainty and complexity. Because there is no objective measure of
whether a related transferor has been relieved of a liability, regardless of the
parties' agreement, the economic benefit model of section 1001 may be misplaced in the context of section 351 transfers.
C. NonrecourseLiabilities
Section 357(d) does not alter the default rule that a transfer of property subject
to a nonrecourse liability generally relieves the transferor of the liability, consistent with Tufts principles. Under prior law, however, it was unclear how nonrecourse liabilities secured by more than one asset should be allocated." The
government's apparent unwillingness to permit an allocation of such liabilities
among encumbered assets may have indirectly encouraged tax-shelter promoters
to exploit the resulting uncertainty. Rather than direct Treasury to provide regulatory guidance, Congress chose to address the problem of cross-collateralized
nonrecourse liabilities by amending section 357.71
Under the original version of the 1999 legislation, cross-collateralized nonrecourse liabilities were required to be allocated ratably based on the relative fair
market values of the acquired and nonacquired assets (determined without regard to section 7701(g)).72 The mandatory proration approach was apparently
abandoned in response to objections that it might not correspond to parties'
economic arrangements. 73 In some circumstances, it may be unrealistic to treat
multiple assets securing a single nonrecourse liability as bearing a proportionate
share of the total liability based on their relative fair market values. A more
flexible approach would allow the parties to allocate a cross-collateralized liability among the encumbered assets in any reasonable manner, subject to a fair-

69
See ABA
7

Comments, supra note 2, 27.
The Service initially ruled that a transfer of multiple assets did not give rise to section 357(c)
gain when a "subject to" recourse liability was allocated between two contributed assets securing the
liability. See P.L.R. 1987-30-063 (Apr. 29, 1987). The Service subsequently revoked its own prior
ruling and refused to permit allocation of cross-collateralized liabilities. See P.L.R. 1990-32-006
(Apr. 26, 1990) (revoking prior ruling without explanation); T.A.M. 1996-40-001 (Nov. 29, 1994)
(rejecting proration approach).
7
Unlike section 357(d), the section 1001 regulations do not provide any special rule for nonrecourse liabilities secured by more than a single asset.
72
See FY1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL DESCRITION, supra note 2, at 158; H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. §
3301A(b) (1998) (proposing section 357(c)(4)(B)).
73
See ABA Comments, supra note 2, 19.
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market-value limitation.74
The 1999 Act establishes a deemed assumption rule for cross-collateralized
nonrecourse liabilities that may be varied by agreement. If a nonrecourse liability is secured by both acquired and nonacquired assets, section 357(d)(1)(B)
presumes that the transferee has assumed the entire amount of the nonrecourse
liability. Under the special rule of section 357(d)(2), the amount of the liability
treated as assumed is reduced by the portion of such liability that an owner of
other nonacquired assets securing the same liability agrees with the transferee to,
and is expected to, satisfy.75 The retained portion of the liability may not exceed
the fair market value of non-acquired assets also subject to the same liability
(determined without regard to section 7701(g)).
For example, assume that a nonrecourse liability of $500 is secured by two
zero-basis parcels, Asset #1 (worth $200) and Asset #2 (worth $800). In a
section 351 transaction, A contributes Asset #1 to X but retains Asset #2. Under
a mandatory proration rule, X would be treated as assuming $100 of the nonrecourse liability, that is, one fifth of the $500 nonrecourse liability based on the
relative fair market values of the two assets. Under the special rule of section
357(d)(2), however, the parties are free to allocate the nonrecourse liability in a
different ratio. For example, if A agrees to, and is expected to, satisfy $450 of
the nonrecourse liability, X is deemed to assume only $50 of the liability. If the
parties fail to specify any particular allocation of the nonrecourse liability, the
default rule of section 357(d)(1)(B) applies.
The presumption that the transferee has assumed the entire amount of nonrecourse liabilities secured by both acquired and nonacquired assets may lead to
anomalous results. In the above example, the default rule would treat X as
assuming the entire $500 nonrecourse liability, even though the fair market
value of the contributed property (Asset #1) is only $200. Accordingly, A would
recognize $500 of section 357(c) gain. Prior to 1999, X's basis in the contributed
property would apparently also be increased, under section 362, from zero to
$500 to reflect the entire section 357(c) gain recognized by A.76 Thus, the basis
of the contributed property in X's hands could potentially be increased above its
fair market value.

77

By analogy to section 752(c), a more sensible approach might be to impose a
fair-market-value limitation on the amount of nonrecourse liabilities deemed
74
The liability-sharing rules of subchapter K adopt such a flexible approach. See Reg. § 1.7523(b)(1). Under the section 752 regulations, an allocation method is deemed unreasonable if it allocates a nonrecourse liability to a particular asset in excess of its fair market value (determined
without
regard to section 770 1(g)). See Reg. § 1.752-3(b)(1).
75
The reference to an "owner" of other property is presumably intended to permit a person other
than
76 the transferor to agree to satisfy a portion of the liability encumbering the transferred property.
See I.R.C. § 362(a) (stating transferee's basis in contributed property increased by the amount of
gain
77 recognized by the transferor).
The 1999 Act amended section 362 to prevent an increase to the basis of contributed property
above its fair market value as a result of section 357(c) gain. See Miscellaneous Trade and Technical
Corrections Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-36, § 3001(b)(2), 113 Stat. 127, 182-83; I.R.C. § 362(d)(1);
see also infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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assumed by the transferee.78 Consistent with section 752(c), the nonrecourse
liability of $500 would be treated as an obligation of X only to the extent of the
fair market value of the contributed property.79 Accordingly, X would be deemed
to assume only $200 of the nonrecourse liability, the amount not in excess of the
fair market value of Asset #1. For purposes of determining X's transferred basis
in Asset #1, A would be deemed to recognize hypothetical section 357(c) gain of
$200 ($200 liabilities relieved less zero basis). Under section 362, X would be
entitled to increase the basis of Asset #1 to $200 to reflect A's hypothetical
section 357(c) gain.8" Thus, X's basis in the contributed property would be
limited to its fair market value.
In the partnership context, the fair-market-value limitation of section 752(c)
has been described as intended to prevent inflation of the basis of contributed
property in the partnership's hands.8' Section 752(c) should not be construed,
however, as limiting the amount of liabilities of which the transferor is relieved.82 In the case of the transferor, the fair market value of the contributed
property should be irrelevant for purposes of determining Tufts gain.83 Hence, A
should be deemed to be relieved of the entire nonrecourse liability of $500, even
though X is treated as assuming only $200 of the liability. When applicable, a
fair-market-value limitation on the amount of liabilities assumed by the transferee would give rise to a disparity between the transferor's section 357(c) gain
and the transferee's section 362 basis adjustment. Thus, X would be entitled to
only a $200 basis increase in the contributed property, even though A is required
to recognize $500 of gain. Of course, A could avoid recognizing section 357(c)
gain by agreeing to satisfy the excess portion of the nonrecourse liability to the
extent of the fair market value of property retained by A and secured by the same
liability.
There are sound policy reasons to treat the transferor and transferee asymmetrically with respect to the amount of liabilities relieved and assumed.84 The
7
See I.R.C. § 752(c) (treating a nonrecourse obligation as a liability of the owner only to the
extent of the fair market value of encumbered property).
79
The fair-market-value limitation should not apply if the discounted present value of the debt
(although not its face amount) is less than the fair market value of the contributed property, e.g.,
because the liability bears a low rate of interest in comparison to the prevailing interest rate.
'Consistent with the section 1001 regulations, X's amount realized on a subsequent sale should
include only the portion of the nonrecourse liability ($200) taken into account for basis purposes
under section 362. See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3).
"1See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 316. See also Andrews, supra note 29, at 958 n.52; Karen C. Burke,
Partnership Formation Under the Temporary Section 752 Regulations:A Reply and FurtherDiscussion,
69 TAXES 116, 125 (1991).
82
See Andrews, supra note 29, at 959.
3
1 1n the case of recourse liabilities, the total fair market value of the transferred assets will usually
exceed the amount of liabilities assumed. If recourse liabilities are assumed in excess of the fair
market value of the transferred assets, however, the transferor may be treated as receiving a constructive distribution. See Yin, supra note 43. Alternatively, the transferor may be required to
recognize additional gain attributable to assumed recourse liabilities in excess of fair market value
(and basis). See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
'See Andrews, supra note 29, at 956 (noting that consistency does not generally require treating
the transferee as taking the property subject to the full amount of the liabilities of which the
transferor is relieved).
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transferee can be analogized to a purchaser whose basis in the acquired property
should normally not exceed its cost. Preventing inflation of the transferee's basis
above fair market value is necessary to avoid excessive depreciation or misstatement of income.85 Generally, a purchaser's basis in acquired property should
reflect its cost, regardless of the amount of gain recognized by the seller. The
nonrecognition policy underlying section 351 contemplates that any built-in gain
or loss inherent in contributed property will be preserved in the hands of both
the transferor and transferee. Any gain recognized by the transferor normally
results in a corresponding increase in the transferee's transferred basis, preventing such gain from being taxed again in the transferee's hands.86 Prior to the
1999 legislation, neither the statute nor the regulations expressly prohibited a
section 362 adjustment that would cause the basis of contributed property to
exceed its fair market value. Gain recognition by the transferor should not serve
as a justification, however, for allowing the transferee to take an inflated basis in
contributed property.87 While a section 752(c) approach would prevent basis
inflation in the hands of the transferee, Congress has apparently chosen a different approach under section 362.
IV. PREVENTING BASIS INFLATION
A. Overview
In 1999, Congress amended the basis provisions of section 362 to prevent
creation of artificial basis. Under section 362(d)(1), the transferee's basis in
contributed property may not be increased above fair market value (determined
without regard to section 7701(g)) by reason of assumption of liabilities.88
Simultaneously, section 362(d)(2) further limits basis adjustments attributable to
assumption of cross-collateralized nonrecourse liabilities.8 9 If the transferor is a
tax-exempt entity or a foreign entity not subject to U.S. tax, section 362(d)(2)
provides that the transferee's basis increase in the contributed property is determined as if the transferee had assumed only a ratable portion of such liabilities
based on the relative fair market values of the acquired and non-acquired assets.
Although the special rule of section 362(d)(2) is unlikely to affect most nonabusive transactions, the fair-market-value limitation under section 362(d)(1) is
much more widely applicable.
B. Anti-Tax-Shelter Provision: Section 362(d)(2)
The purpose of section 362(d)(2) is to prevent artificial, inflation of the
transferee's basis in acquired property as a result of section 357(c) gain recog-

85
See, e.g., Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988); Estate of
v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
Franklin
86
See I.R.C. § 362(a).
87
See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 10 (criticizing interpretations of prior law that
arguably might result "in assets having a tax basis in excess of their value").
"See I.R.C. § 362(d)(1).
89
See I.R.C. § 362(d)(2).

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 56, No. 2

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC REALITY

nized by a tax-indifferent party. 90 Absent section 362(d)(2), section 357(d) would
be inadequate to prevent the type of tax-shelter abusestargeted by Congress. For
purposes of determining the transferor's section 357(c) gain and the transferee's
section 362 basis adjustment, however, the amount of liabilities assumed may no
longer match.9'
Assume that a foreign corporation (FC) owns two assets, Asset #1 with a
basis of $50 and a fair market value of $100 and Asset #2 with a basis of $5 and
a fair market value of $25; both assets secure a single nonrecourse liability of
$80. FC contributes Asset #1 to X, a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary; FC does not
agree with X to satisfy any portion of the nonrecourse Iiability. Under section
357(d)(1)(B), X is deemed to assume the entire $80 nonrecourse liability, triggering gain of $30 to FC ($80 liability less $50 basis of Asset #1). Thus, X
would normally be entitled to increase the basis of Asset #1 from $50 to $80.
Assuming FC does not pay any U.S. tax on the section 357(c) gain, however, the
special rule of section 362(d)(2) limits the basis increase in X's hands to the
amount of gain FC would have recognized if the $80 nonrecourse liability were
allocated ratably between the two assets based on their .relative fair market
values. A prorata allocation would assign $64 of the liability to Asset #1 ($100/
$125) and $16 of the liability to Asset #2 ($25/$125). Under section 362(d)(2),
X's basis increase is limited to $14 ($64 assigned liability less $50 basis of
Asset #1).92
Section 362(d)(2) applies only if a tax-indifferent party recognizes section
357(c) gain attributable to nonrecourse liabilities secured by both acquired and
non-acquired assets. Read literally, however, the statutory language of section
362(d)(2) arguably sanctions a basis increase in excess of the amount of section
357(c) gain actually recognized. In the preceding example, assume that FC
contributes Asset #2 (rather than Asset #1) and agrees to remain liable for $70 of
the nonrecourse liability. Under section 357(d)(2), X is deemed to assume only
$10 of the nonrecourse liability, triggering section 357(c) gain of $5 to FC ($10
liability less $5 basis of Asset #2), and X should be entitled to a basis increase of
$5 in Asset #2. If section 362(d)(2) applies, however, X's basis increase is
apparently determined as if FC had recognized gain of $11, i.e., one fifth of the
liability ($16) less the basis of Asset #2 ($5).
Clearly, such a literal reading produces an absurd result: X's basis increase
($11) exceeds the amount of section 357(c) gain actually recognized by FC ($5).
The problem is that sections 357(d) and 362(d) employ different measures to
determine the amount of liabilities assumed. In enacting section 362(d)(2), Congress intended to prevent basis inflation by imposing a prorata allocation method
to determine the transferor's hypothetical gain.93 The statute should specify that

9°See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 10.
91
See Banks-Golub, supra note 5, at 21.
92
The amount of liabilities assumed for purposes of determining the transferee's basis adjustment

($64) is $16 less than the amount of liabilities of which the transferor is relieved ($80).
93

See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 10.
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the hypothetical gain recognized by the transferor (for purposes of determining
the transferee's basis adjustment under section 362(d)(2)) may be less than but
not more than the actual gain recognized under section 357(c). Nevertheless, a
technical correction may be necessary to achieve this result.
Section 362(d)(2) would be unnecessary if cross-collateralized nonrecourse
liabilities were always allocated in accordance with the relative fair market
values of acquired and non-acquired assets securing the same liabilities.9 4 Allowing greater flexibility in allocating norecourse liabilities under section 357(d)
increases the need to police the corresponding basis adjustments under section
362. Section 362(d)(2) applies only for purposes of determining the basis of
contributed property, not the amount of liabilities assumed by the transferee.
Under prior law, it was unnecessary to specify the amount of liabilities assumed
by the transferee, because the transferee's transferred basis reflected the basis of
the contributed property increased by any section 357(c) gain recognized by the
transferor.95 Under section 1001, the amount of liabilities assumed by the transferee may be important upon a subsequent disposition of the property. Consistent with the section 1001 regulations, the transferee's amount realized on a
subsequent disposition should presumably include only those liabilities actually
taken into account in determining the transferred basis of the contributed property,96 Because of the potential mismatch of liabilities assumed for purposes of
sections 357(d) and 362(d), however, the consequences under section 1001 should
be clarified.
C. Fair-Market-Value Limitation: Section 362(d)(1)
Section 362(d)(1) provides an overall limitation on section 362 basis adjustments when assumption of liabilities (recourse or nonrecourse) triggers recognition of section 357(c) gain. Under section 362(d)(1), the basis of contributed
property may never be increased above its fair market value (determined without
regard to section 7701(g)) as a result of section 357(c) gain.97 Except as a
general anti-abuse measure, Congress failed to explain the underlying purpose
or operation of the fair-market-value limitation.98 The enactment of section
362(d)(1) may exacerbate existing flaws in the allocation of basis adjustments

'See
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
95
See I.R.C. § 362(d)(2) (flush language) (limitation applies only "for purposes of determining
basis under [section 362](a) and (b)"). Under prior law, the amount of liabilities assumed by the
transferee matched the liabilities of which the transferor was relieved: while section 357 governed
the consequences to the transferor, section 362 determined the basis consequences to the transferee
by reference to the transferor's gain recognized.
96
See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3).
97
Presumably, Congress was not concerned that the basis of contributed property might be inflated
as a result of recognized gain attributable to non-liability boot (e.g., cash), as the transferee generally
would not pay an amount in excess of the fair market value of contributed property.
9
See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 10; Kliegman & Martin, supra note 6, at 8-9
(suggesting that section 362(d)(1) is intended to reflect case law imposing a fair-market-value
limitation on a purchaser's basis in property acquired with nonrecourse financing).
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attributable to section 357(c) gain. 99
Assume that A contributes the following assets to X corporation in exchange
for stock:
Assets

Basis

FMV

Percentageof
Gross FMV

Land
Building
Inventory
Total

$10
40
75
$125

$40
100
60
$200

20%
50%
30%
100%

Percentageof
Appreciation
33.33%
66.67%
100%

In addition, X assumes unsecured liabilities of A in the amount of $135."
Under the aggregate approach of section 357(c), A's total gain is determined by
comparing the total amount of liabilities relieved and the total basis of the
transferred assets. Thus, A recognizes $10 of section 357(c) gain ($135 liabilities
assumed less $125 basis). Under the section 357 regulations, the characterof
A's gain is determined by allocating the recognized gain among the assets ratably based on their relative fair market values.'' Accordingly, the gain is allocated 20% to the land ($2), 50% to the building ($5), and 30% to the inventory
($3). The allocation method prescribed by the section 357 regulations is obviously flawed because it ignores unrealized appreciation or depreciation inherent
in the contributed property. Thus, it produces the anomalous result of allocating
gain to an ordinary income asset (inventory) with a basis in excess of fair market

value. 102

"See generally Joel Rabinovitz, Allocating Boot in Section 351 Exchanges, 24 TAx L. REv. 333
(1969); Benjamin J. Cohen & Ronald E. Whitney, Revisiting the Allocation of Boot in Section 351

Exchanges, 48 TAX

LAW.

959 (1995).

"5For simplicity, it is assumed that the liabilities are not directly allocated to any of the transferred
assets. In the case of a secured liability, the issue is whether there should be a direct allocation of
section 357(c) gain to the extent that the secured liability exceeds the tax basis of the encumbered
asset. See Rabinovitz, supra note 99, at 345 (arguing that, but for a contrary inference in the
regulations, "it would seem obvious that [secured liabilities] should be allocated entirely to the assets
to which they adhere"); Cohen & Whitney, supra note 99, at 1005-06 (following Rabinovitz in
supporting a direct allocation of section 357(c) gain attributable to excess secured liabilities).
15t See Reg. § 1.357-2(b). The Service requires cash and other boot received under section 351(b)
to be allocated ratably among the transferred assets in proportion to their fair market value. See Rev.
Rul. 1968-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 1985-164, 1985-2 C.B. 117. The asset-by-asset approach
is intended to prevent offsetting of recognized gains and unrecognized losses that would otherwise
result under an aggregate approach. The tension between the asset-by-asset approach under section
351 (b) and the aggregate approach under section 357(c) is responsible for much of the complexity in
allocating liabilities. See Cohen & Whitney, supra note 99, at 970.
'O2See Rabinovitz, supra note 99, at 360; Cohen & Whitney, supra note 99, at 990. For an
argument that section 357(c) gain should be treated entirely as capital gain attributable to the stock
received in the exchange, see John D. Fredericks, The Characterof Section 357(c) Gain. Why the
Underlying Regulation is Capable of Producing Absurd Results, 48 TAX LAW. 167 (1994). Courts
have generally declined to follow the approach of Regulation section 1.357-2, albeit without much
discussion. See, e.g., Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11, 19-20 (1974), affd without pub. op., 515
F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding it "only logical" that gain should be allocated to asset subject to
depreciation); Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604, 611 (1966) (allocating gain among appreciated
assets).
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If the same allocation method is used to apportion the transferee's basis increase among contributed assets, the assets end up with the following bases in
the transferee's hands: land ($12), building ($45), and inventory ($78).1°3 Prior
to the 1999 changes, $3 of the upward basis adjustment would thus be assigned
to the inventory even though it had declined in value. Section 362(d)(1) cures
this problem by preventing any adjustment that would increase the disparity
between the inventory's basis and fair market value. It is unclear, however,
whether the disallowed portion of the basis adjustment simply disappears or may
be reallocated to other appreciated property. Because the impermissible basis
adjustment results solely from the flawed allocation method under the section
357 regulations, reallocation would not undermine the purpose of section 362(d)
to prevent inflation of basis above fair market value."04
A more sensible allocation method would focus on the relative appreciation
05
inherent in the contributed assets rather than their relative fair market values.
Under this method, A's recognized gain of $10 would be allocated 33.33% to the
land ($3.33) and 66.67% to the building ($6.67), and X would take a transferred
basis of $13.33 in the land and $46.67 in the building. No basis adjustment
would be permitted to the inventory which has declined in value. 106 Allocating
section 362 basis adjustments in accordance with relative appreciation is consistent with the aggregate approach of section 357(c) and reduces the disparity
07
between basis and fair market value of the acquired assets. 1
The analysis is similar if contributed property is subject to liabilities in excess
of its fair market value and basis. Assume that A contributes the following assets
to X corporation in exchange for stock:
Assets

Basis

FMV

Nonrecourse
Liabilities

Land
Building
Inventory
Total

$10
40
75
$125

$40
100
60
$200

$40
195
$235

""Although the section 357 regulations address only the consequences to the transferor, the
allocation of the transferee's basis increase should presumably be determined in 'a similar manner.
See Reg. § 1.357-2(a), -2(b); Rabinovitz, supra note 99, at 365 (noting that the basis of each asset in
the transferee's hands should be equal to the transferor's basis in the asset, increased by the transferor's
recognized gain allocable to such asset).
'O'Congress was apparently unaware of the flaws inherent in the allocation method under the
existing section 357 regulations; the fair-market-value limitation under section 362 was aimed at
perceived tax-shelter abuses.
"'5See Rabinovitz, supra note 99, at 361-65. Under the partnership rules, basis adjustments are
generally determined under a refined version of the suggested approach. See Reg. § 1.755-1 (allocation of basis adjustments under sections 734(b) and 743(b)).
1""Thus, A's recognized gain would consist exclusively of capital gain and section 1231 gain rather
than a combination of such gain and ordinary income.
"I7In the above example, assume that the building is subject to a secured liability of $50; X
assumes the secured liability and unsecured liabilities of A in the amount of $85. If section 357(c)
gain is allocated directly to encumbered assets to the extent of the excess, if any, of secured
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A recognizes section 357(c) gain of $110 ($235 liabilities relieved less $125
basis). Under section 362(d)(1), the basis of the contributed assets may not be
increased above fair market value as a result of A's recognized gain. Because the
total appreciation inherent in the contributed assets is only $90, $20 of the
potential basis adjustment apparently disappears.' The remaining adjustment of
$90 is sufficient to increase the basis of the two appreciated assets (the land and
building) to fair market value. 1°9 Although this allocation respects the fair-market-value limitation of section 362(d)(1), it produces a greater basis step-up than
if the contributed property were not subject to liabilities in excess of fair market
value."
To illustrate, assume that the assets are transferred subject to a single nonrecourse liability in the amount of $200 (rather than $235). In this case, A recognizes section 357(c) gain of $75 ($200 liability relieved less $125 basis). The
section 362 basis adjustment is allocated $25 to the land (1/3) and $50 to the
building (2/3) in accordance with their relative appreciation; thus, X takes a
transferred basis of $35 in the land and $90 in the building. Following allocation
of the section 362 basis adjustment, the land and building have combined unrealized appreciation of $15 ($140 fair market value less $125 transferred basis).
The $15 of unrealized appreciation in the land and building mirrors the $15 of
built-in loss inherent in the inventory. The result is appropriate because, under
the aggregate approach of section 357(c), A recognizes only $75 of gain attributable to relief of liabilities ($90 built-in gain inherent in the land and building
offset by the $15 built-in loss inherent in the inventory). "' The basis adjustment
under section 362 should not exceed $75 merely because A recognizes additional section 357(c) gain attributable to relief of liabilities in excess of the fair
market value of the contributed property.
The difficulty is that the fair-market-value limitation of section 362(d)(1)
applies to the amount of the basis step-up in the hands of the transferee rather
than the amount of liabilities assumed by the transferee. If the transferee's

liabilities over the tax bases of such assets, the entire $10 gain should be treated as attributable to the
building. See supra note 100.
'Under the flawed allocation method of the section 357 regulations, the basis adjustment of $110
(before application of the fair-market-value limitation) would be allocated 50% to the building ($55),
20% to the land ($22), and 30% to the inventory ($33); the entire $33 basis adjustment allocable to
the inventory would potentially disappear.
10"The $90 adjustment is allocated in accordance with the relative appreciation in the land (1/3)
and building (2/3). See infra notes 146, 149 (discussing allocation of secured liabilities in excess of
fair market value of encumbered property).
"'As explained below, the section 362(d)(1) limitation apparently allows an additional basis
increase of $15 (allocable to the land and building) which mirrors the $15 of built-in loss inherent in
the inventory.
"'The operation of section 357(c) should be compared with the tax consequences if A received
$200 cash (rather than $200 relief of liabilities). The cash boot would be allocated among the assets
in accordance with their relative fair market values, and A would recognize gain equal to the
difference between the basis of each asset and its allocable share of the boot. See Rev. Rul. 1968-55,
1968-1 C.B. 140. Thus, A would recognize total gain of $90 (allocable $30 to the land and $60 to the
building) and the basis of the contributed assets would be increased accordingly.
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assumption of liabilities were limited to the aggregate fair market value of
contributed property, the hypothetical section 357(c) gain would not exceed the
total built-in appreciation in the contributed property. Under this approach, the
hypothetical section 357(c) gain and corresponding section 362 basis adjustment
would be limited to $75 ($200 liabilities assumed less $125 basis), the same
result as if the total liabilities encumbering the contributed property were $200.
Thus, the excess basis of the inventory ($15) would not reduce the remaining
built-in gain in the land and building ($15). Although Congress clearly intended
to prevent inflation of the basis of contributed property, this goal might have
been more appropriately accomplished by imposing a fair-market-value limitation on the liabilities assumed by the transferee. As both a conceptual and a
practical matter, such a fair-market-value limitation seems preferable to the
approach of section 362(d)(1)(A).
V. DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENCUMBERED PROPERTY: SHOULD SECTION
357(d) PRINCIPLES APPLY?
A. Overview
Assumption of liabilities is important in connection with distributions of property from a corporation as well as contributions of property to a corporation.
Recently-issued regulations under section 301 extend the liability assumption
rules of section 357(d) to distributions of encumbered property to shareholders." 2 Under sections 311(b) and 336(b), relief of liabilities in connection with
distributions of encumbered property may also trigger recognition of corporatelevel gain." 3 Although Congress did not consider the impact of the amended
liability assumption rules on the distribution provisions, conforming amendments are necessary to restore parity between contributions and distributions of
encumbered property." 4
B. Section 301 Distributions
Congress had barely shut down section 357(c) abuses before it became necessary to address the issue of artificial losses in connection with distributions of
encumbered property." 5 While such transactions were cast in a variety of forms,
typically taxpayers acted through a partnership (P) to contribute cash to a foreign corporation (FC) in exchange for common stock; FC acquired securities
with borrowed funds and distributed the encumbered securities to P, which was
secondarily liable for the bank debt. Even though FC was expected ultimately to
repay the borrowing from other assets, the parties asserted that the net amount of

"'See Reg. § 1.301-1(g).
" 3See I.R.C. §§ 311 (b), 336(a)-(b).
"4Similarly, Congress failed to extend section 357(d) principles to distributions of encumbered
property pursuant to a corporate reorganization. See I.R.C. § 361(c)(2)(C); but see I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(b)
1
See Notice 1999-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761; see also Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury Shuts Down the Boss
Tax Shelter, 85 TAX NovEs 1351 (Dec. 13, 1999).
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the section 301 distribution was zero, i.e., the fair market value of the securities
reduced by the underlying debt." 6 Upon a subsequent disposition (or deemed
disposition)" 7 of the common stock (now worth zero), the parties hoped to'claim
an artificial loss equal to the value of their original investment." 8
Under section 301(b)(2), the amount of a section 301 distribution is generally
reduced (but not below zero) by liabilities assumed by the shareholder or taken
subject to in connection with the distribution. By analogy to the case law interpreting former section 357, a mechanical reading of section 301(b)(2)(B) arguably provided support for the position that a distributee should be treated as
assuming a liability encumbering distributed property even though the primary
obligor was not released from the liability. Despite a paucity of authority interpreting section 301(b)(2)(B), at least one case rejected such a literal reading of
the statute. In Maher v. Commissioner,"' the court refused to take a liability into
account for purposes of section 301 because it found that the parties did not
actually treat the distributed property as security for the liability.'2 0 Rather than
relying on Maher, Notice 1999-59 invoked the economic substance doctrine to
2
attack artificial losses generated by abusive section 301 transactions.' '
In issuing the amended section 301 regulations, Treasury indicated that the
lack of specific guidance under section 301(b)(2) had encouraged taxpayers to
interpret existing law in a manner that "fail[ed] to reflect the true economics of
certain transactions.' ' 22 Henceforth, the amount of a section 301 distribution is
reduced only to the extent that the distributee assumes, within the meaning of
section 357(d), liabilities encumbering the distributed property. 123 For example,

..See I.R.C. § 301(b)(2) (reduction for liabilities assumed). For example, assume that P contributes $100 in exchange for common stock of FC, and that FC distributes securities worthapproximately $100 to P, subject to bank debt of $100. If the bank debt reduces the amount of the
distribution to zero, no portion of the distribution constitutes a dividend or reduction of stock basis
under section 301(c).
7
" A deemed disposition of the common stock could be triggered by an elective change in the
classification of FC (an LLC) from a corporation to a partnership. See Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i),
-(g)(1)(ii).
"P's tax loss would equal the excess of P's unreduced basis in FC's stock ($100) over the postdistribution value of the stock (zero). The claimed tax loss assumes that FC's later payment of the
debt does not constitute a constructive dividend, even though P is released from its secondary
liability. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, Another Corporate Tax Shelter, Another Court Decision,
85 TAX NoTEs 1229 (Dec. 6, 1999) (commenting on marketing of the section 301 tax shelter).
"'See
Maher v. Commissioner, 69-1 U.S.T.C. T 9194 at 83,891 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
' 2°See id. at 83,894 (mortgage encumbering distributed property was not a "liability" within the
meaning of section 301(b)(2)); see Sheppard, supra note 118, at 1234 (arguing that secondary
liability of distributee in the section 301 tax shelter was "just a device worked out by the bank in
collusion with the tax-shelter promoter to achieve a particular tax result").
2
' See Notice 1999-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999). The Service's emphasis on the lack of economic
substance and the contrived nature of the various transactional steps obviated the need to address
directly
the problem of interpreting the liability assumption rules of section 301.
22
1 T. D. 8924 (Preamble), 66 Fed. Reg. 723, 724 (2001) [hereinafter Preamble] (noting that "[flor
reasons similar to those that motivated the enactment of section 357(d), these interpretations are
inappropriate for purposes of section 301").
23
' Reg. § 1.301-1(g).
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assume that X corporation distributes property with a basis and fair market value
of $4,000, subject to a nonrecourse liability of $3,000. Under section 357(d)(1)(B),
the distributee is treated as assuming the $3,000 nonrecourse liability. 24 The
result would be identical if the property were instead subject to a recourse
liability of $3,000, which the distributee agreed to, and was expected to, satisfy. 25 In each case, the amount of the distribution would be $1,000 ($4,000 fair
market value less $3,000 liability). If no assumption is deemed to occur under
section 357(d), the distributee is treated as receiving a section 301 distribution
equal to the fair market value of the encumbered property.' 26
The amended section 301 regulations do not specify the potential tax consequences if the parties subsequently treat assumed liabilities in a manner inconsistent with their initial characterization. For example, if a distributee assumes a
liability within the meaning of section 357(d), subsequent satisfaction of the
liability by the distributing corporation may be treated as a constructive dividend. 27 Conversely, a deemed capital contribution may occur if a shareholder
subsequently satisfies a liability, which the distributing corporation was expected to satisfy for purposes of section 357(d). 2 s In this situation, the parties
might have achieved a similar result if the distributing corporation initially paid
the liability with funds supplied by the shareholder
and then distributed the
29
unencumbered property to the shareholder.
When appreciated property is distributed, earnings and profits are adjusted
upward to reflect the built-in appreciation inherent in such property; 30 earnings
and profits are then adjusted downward by the fair market value of the distributed property reduced by the amount of any liabilities assumed in connection
with the distribution. 3' If section 357(d) principles apply to section 301 distributions, it is important to clarify that the amount of liabilities taken into account
for purposes of section 312 is determined in the same manner. Otherwise, the
section 312 adjustment will no longer match the amount treated as a section 301
distribution under section 357(d) principles. 3 2 Treasury should also address the
effect of assumption of liabilities in excess of the fair market value of distributed

24

See I.R.C. § 357(d)(l)(B).
'See I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(A).
' Regardless of the amount of liabilities assumed, the distributee takes a basis in the distributed
property
equal to its fair market value. See I.R.C. § 301(d).
127See Preamble, supra note 122; Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781, 799 (1972) (finding
constructive dividend where corporation discharged shareholder's personal liability).
128See
Preamble, supra note 122.
129The distributee would be treated as receiving a section 301 distribution equal to the fair market
value of the distributed property and would increase stock basis to reflect the actual or deemed
capital contribution.
3
'See I.R.C. §§ 312(a), (b).
31
"'
See l.R.C. § 312(c); Reg. § 1.312-3.
32
For example, assume that property with a basis and fair market value of $4,000, subject to a
liability of $3,000, is distributed to a shareholder who does not assume the liability within the
meaning of section 357(d). Although the amount of the section 301 distribution is clearly $4,000, the
charge to earning and profits is arguably only $1,000 ($4,000 fair market value of distributed
property reduced by $3,000 "subject to" liability).
26
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property. Under section 312(b)(1), earnings and profits are increased by the
excess of the distributed property's fair.market value over its adjusted basis.'33
To account properly for excess liabilities, the reference to fair market value
should be clarified to take into account the deemed fair-market-value rule of
34
section 311 (b)(2).1
C. Avoiding Corporate-Level Gain Recognition
To restore parity between contributions and distributions of encumbered property, section 357(d) principles should arguably be extended to sections 31 l(b)(2)
and 336(b). Former section 31 (c), the forerunner of current sections 311(b)(2)
and 336(b), was enacted in 1954 to address tax-avoidance opportunities in connection with distributions of encumbered property.' 35 Even prior to repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, a nonliquidating distribution of encumbered property
triggered recognition of a limited amount of gain.' 36 Under current law, the fair
market value of distributed property is treated as not less than the amount of any
liability encumbering the property. Thus, sections 31 1(b)(2) and 336(b) employ
the fiction of a deemed sale of the distributed property for consideration equal to
the transferor's liabilities relieved.'37 If the fair market value of the distributed
property exceeds the underlying liability, sections 311(b)(2) and 336(b) are
irrelevant.
Assume that X corporation distributes property with a basis and fair market
value of $150, subject to a recourse liability of $200, in a nonliquidating distribution. Under section 31 l(b)(2), the fair market value of the distributed property
is deemed to be $200, and X recognizes gain of $50. For purposes of determining corporate-level gain, it does not matter whether the liability is recourse or

33
' See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 33, T 8.22[2], at 8-87 to 8-88 (noting that section 312(b)(1)
might be read to limit the upward adjustment to earnings and profits to the excess of the actual fair
market value (without regard to section 311 (b)(2)) over the basis of the distributed property).
"S4See I.R.C. §§ 31 l(b)(2), 336(b) (fair market value of property deemed to be not less than the
amount of liabilities encumbering such property). For example, assume that a corporation distributes
property with a basis of zero and a fair market value of $10, subject to a nonrecourse liability of $12.
For purposes of section 312, the corporation would recognize gain of $12 under section 311 (b) ($12
liability less zero basis); e&p would not be further adjusted because the net distribution is zero (the
deemed fair market value less the amount of liabilities assumed). See Boyd C. Randall & Dave N.
Stewart, Corporate Distributions:Handling Liabilities in Excess of the Fair Market Value of Prop,
erty Remains Unresolved, 19 J. CORP. TAX'N 55, 61-62 (1992).
'The legislative history indicates the former section 311 (c) (originally proposed as section 308(c))
was concerned with possible abuses in connection with corporate distributions of encumbered property similar to those addressed by section 357(c). See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, A91 (1954), reprinted
in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4062; Crane, supra note 30, at 125 n. 43.
36
Former section 311 (c) limited gain recognition to the difference between the distributed property's
basis and the lesser of the liabilities relieved or the fair market value of the distributed property. See
I.R.C. § 311 (c). The fair-market-value limitation apparently reflected the economic benefit rule of
Crane. See Crane,supra note 30, at 127 n.45.
"'See, e.g., George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 573, 587 (1987). See id. at 587 n.64 (noting that Congress
apparently intended that an acquisition liability would be ignored to the extent such liability was
never included in the corporation's basis in the distributed property).
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nonrecourse. Extending section 357(d) principles to section 311 (b)(2) would
generally not affect corporate-level gain recognition when encumbered property
is distributed subject to nonrecourse liabilities in excess of fair market value.' 38
In the case of recourse liabilities, however, section 357(d)(1)(A) would allow the
distributing corporation to avoid section 311(b)(2) gain by agreeing to satisfy
the portion of the liability in excess of the distributed property's fair market
value. For example, X could agree to remain liable for the excess $50 of the
recourse liability.'39 If the distributed property is foreclosed upon in the
distributee's hands when its fair market value is $150, X would be required to
pay the deficiency of $50."4o Because X may still be required to satisfy the debt
in excess of fair market value, there is apparently no reason to trigger section
31 l(b)(2) gain.
Under a deemed capital contribution model, X could also avoid recognition of
section 311 (b)(2) gain if the distributee agrees to, and is expected to, satisfy the
excess $50 of the recourse liability. 4 ' The distributee's assumption of the excess
recourse liability should arguably be treated as analogous to an actual contribution of cash; no section 311(b)(2) gain would be triggered because X would be
deemed to use the capital contribution to satisfy the excess recourse liability
immediately prior to the distribution. 4 2 In the case of nonrecourse liabilities in
excess of fair market value, however, recognition of corporate-level gain seems
appropriate because there is insufficient assurance that the distributee will eventually satisfy such liabilities. 43 The deemed capital contribution model is inconsistent with the statutory fiction of a sale of the distributed property for
consideration equal to the liabilities relieved.'" Under section 357(d) principles,
however, there does not seem to be any compelling reason to insist on the
deemed sale model to the extent that the distributee agrees to, and is expected to,
satisfy any recourse liabilities in excess of fair market value.
A corporate distribution may consist of multiple assets, only some of which
are subject to liabilities in excess of fair market value. In this situation, the issue
' 38The deemed fair-market-value rule would apply unless the distributing corporation agreed to
satisfy the excess nonrecourse liability. See I.R.C. § 357(d)(2).
39
1 1f the distributee agrees to, and is expected to, satisfy the remaining $150 of the recourse
liability, the net amount of the section 301 distribution is zero ($150 fair market value less $150
liability) and the distributee takes a fair-market-value basis in the distributed property.
4
By analogy, the section 704(b) regulations contemplate that a partner may be liable for a
specific portion of a liability encumbering partnership property. See Reg. § 1.704-2(m), Ex. 1(vii).
4
Alternatively, the shareholder could agree directly with the creditor to assume $50 of the
liability prior to the distribution; if the assumption is respected, section 311 (b)(2) should be irrelevant.
42 See supra note 65.
W'
See Crane, supra note 30, at 115-16, 132 (treating a shareholder assumption as a deemed capital
contribution); id. at 116 (arguing that deemed sale treatment, under section 336(b), "implies an
unnecessarily strong notion of the values to be included in the corporation tax base and thus subject
to double
taxation").
'43See id. at 127.
'"Under a deemed capital contribution model, the assumption would presumably increase the
shareholder's basis in stock when the liability is paid; the shareholder would be taxed on the fair
market value of the distributed property, without reduction for any liabilities. Cf. I.R.C. § 301(b)(2)
(value of distributed property reduced by liabilities assumed).
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arises whether corporate-level gain should be determined under an aggregate
approach or an asset-by-asset approach. Under former section 311(c), the Service applied an asset-by-asset approach to determine corporate-level gain; presumably, an asset-by-asset approach continues to apply for purposes of current
sections 31 l(b)(2) and 336(b). 45 Under the Service's approach, secured liabilities are allocated directly to encumbered assets and unsecured liabilities are
allocated in proportion to the gross fair market value of all of the assets distributed. 46 For example, assume that X corporation distributes two assets, both of
which are worth $100, in a nonliquidating distribution. Asset #1 has a basis of
$25 and is subject to a recourse liability of $150; Asset #2 has a basis of $100
and is unencumbered. Under an asset-by-asset approach, X would recognize
section 311(b)(2) gain of $125 attributable entirely to Asset #1 ($150 deemed
fair market value less $25 basis). The asset-by-asset approach seems defective:
gain from relief of liabilities may exceed the total gain that would result if the
distributing corporation sold the underlying assets to a third party.'47
An aggregate approach would render the deemed fair-market-value rule irrelevant because the total amount of liabilities ($150) does not exceed the total fair
market value of the distributed assets ($200). Under the general nile of section
311(b)(1), each asset would be treated as sold for its fair market value of $100,
triggering gain of $75 attributable entirely to Asset #1. Thus, X would recognize
the same amount of gain as if both assets were sold to a third party for total
consideration of $200, consisting of $50 cash and $150 relief of liabilities. The
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is intended to ensure that the distributing
corporation will generally recognize the same amount of gain as if the distributed property were actually sold. An aggregate approach would apparently eliminate unintended disparities resulting from imperfect implementation of the deemed
sale model.
Indeed, an aggregate approach might render section 336(b) virtually meaningless because the fair market value of a liquidating corporation's assets usually
exceeds its total liabilities.'48 For example, assume that X distributes all of its
45
In Revenue Ruling 1980-283, 1980-2 C.B. 108, the shareholder received two assets, one of
which was subject to liabilities in excess of basis (but not fair market value). The Service noted that
former section 311 (c) was enacted simultaneously with section 357(c), but only the latter referred
expressly to the excess of aggregate liabilities over aggregate basis. See BiTrKER & EusnCE, supra
note 33, 8.21[3], at 8-81, 10.05[2][a], at 10-29 (noting that the deemed fair-market-value rule of
sections
311 (b)(2) and 336(b) most likely applies on an asset-by-asset basis).
46
1 See H&M Auto Electric, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1269, 1272-75
(1989) (applying Revenue Ruling 1980-283 under former section 31 1(c)). The allocation of unsecured liabilities in proportion to gross, rather than net, fair market value is problematic. See Rabinovitz, supra note 99, at
345 (allocating unsecured liabilities in accordance with net fair market value, i.e., gross fair market
value reduced by any secured liabilities encumbering the asset); Cohen & Whitney, supra note 99, at
984-86
(noting Service's failure to explain its position).
47
1 See Crane, supra note 30, at 139-42.
14See id. at 139 (under an aggregate approach, "[section] 336(b) may have no meaning at all"). If
a liquidating corporation's aggregate liabilities exceed the aggregate fair market value of its assets,
the corporation is presumably insolvent. A liquidation of an insolvent corporation may be entirely
outside section 336 because the shareholders receive no return on their equity. See BrrKER &
EusnIcE, supra note 33,
10.21[2], at 10-63 (noting that section 332 does not apply to liquidation of
insolvent subsidiary).
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assets in complete liquidation. One of the distributed' assets secures a recourse
liability in excess of fair market value, While the other assets are unencumbered.
The aggregate fair market value of the distributed assets, both encumbered and
unencumbered, exceeds the amount of the recourse liability, which X's shareholders assume. Under an aggregate approach, the liquidating distribution triggers no section 336(b) gain: X has not been relieved of liabilities in excess of the
total fair market value of the distributed property.' 49 Because the aggregate approach produces the same result as if X sold the distributed assets to a third
party, it does not appear to circumvent General Utilitiesrepeal. s0
Nevertheless, an aggregate approach should not be permitted to undermine
the loss disallowance rules of sections 311 and 336."'' Assume that X distributes
the following assets in a nonliquidating distribution:
Assets

Basis

FMV

Asset #1
Asset #2
Total

$0
100
$100

$50
50
$100

Recourse Liabilities
$150
$150

Under current section 311 (b), X would be treated as relieved of the recourse
liability secured by Asset #1, regardless, of whether the distributee agrees to
satisfy the liability. If corporate-level gain is determined under an aggregate
approach modeled on section 357(c), X would recognize section 311(b)(2) gain
of $50 ($150 liability less $100 basis). Thus, the recognized gain attributable to
Asset #1 would be offset by the unrecognized loss inherent in Asset #2. Such an
aggregate approach should presumably be rejected as inconsistent with the loss
disallowance rules which are intended to prevent the distributing corporation
from using the excess basis associated with built-in loss assets.
Under a modified aggregate approach, the potential conflict with the loss
disallowance rules may be eliminated. Under such an approach, the secured
liability would be allocated first to Asset #1 to the extent of its fair market value
($50). The portion of the secured liability in excess of the fair market value of
the encumbered property would be treated in the same manner as an unsecured
liability. Accordingly, the remaining liability ($100) would be allocated among

49
' The portion of the recourse liability in excess of the encumbered asset's fair market value
should be treated in the same manner as an unsecured liability. See Cohen & Whitney, supra note
99, at' 1006. If unsecured liabilities are allocated in proportion to net, rather than gross, fair market
value, the entire excess liability would be allocated to the unencumbered assets. See supra note 146.
This result seems correct, because X's shareholders will presumably assume the entire recourse
liability only if the fair market value of the unencumbered assets is sufficient to satisfy the excess
liability.
'If instead the liability were nonrecourse, section 336(b) gain would nevertheless be triggered.
5
' See I.R.C. § 31 l(a) (disallowing recognition of loss on a current distribution); I.R.C. § 336(a)
(allowing recognition of loss on a liquidating distribution except to the extent provided in sections
336(d) and 337). See also Crane, supra note 30, at 140-41 ("The asset-by-asset approach was the
logical consequence of the statutory denial of losses (or, more specifically, the denial of the use of
basis associated with loss property) and the need to preserve the character of any gain on a current
distribution.").
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the distributed assets in proportion to (but not in excess of) the net fair market
value of such assets. Because the net fair market value of Asset #1 is zero ($50
fair market value less $50 allocated liability), $50 of the liability would be
allocated to Asset #2, reducing its net fair market value to zero. The unallocated
$50 of the liability should be treated as triggering an equivalent amount of gain*
under section 31 1(b). 152 Thus, X would not be permitted to use the unrecognized
loss inherent in Asset #2 to offset recognized gain from relief of liabilities.
The modified aggregate approach arguably approximates the results of an
actual sale more closely than the asset-by-asset approach, while preserving the
intended operation of the loss disallowance rules. If section 357(d) principles
were extended to corporate distributions, the modified aggregate approach would
generally eliminate corporate-level gain attributable to relief of recourse liabilities. In the preceding example, X could avoid section 31 l(b)(2) by agreeing to
satisfy the unallocated $50 of the recourse liability. Alternatively, X could agree
to indemnify the distributee to the extent of the excess $50 of the recourse
liability secured by the distributed property.'53 On the other hand, if the distributee agrees to assume the entire recourse liability, X would recognize no section
31 1(b)(2) gain under a deemed capital contribution model.'54 Congress did not
envisage that amending the liability assumption rules of section 357(c) could
radically alter the treatment of corporate distributions of overencumbered property. Nevertheless, the piecemeal extension of section 357(d) to section 301
distributions is likely to foreshadow more extensive changes, unless Congress
reconsiders the recent amendments.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the 1999 amendments were ostensibly intended to shut down sophisticated tax shelters, their impact may be felt chiefly in the case of routine section
351 exchanges that have nothing to do with tax shelters.'55 Despite apparent
Congressional frustration over tax-shelter transactions, it is not clear that the
basis-shifting transactions that prompted the 1999 amendments would have withstood judicial scrutiny under prior law. Even if a legislative fix were necessary,
the economic benefit doctrine is likely to lead to additional -complexity and
uncertainty when property is transferred subject to excess recourse liabilities.
The deemed assumption rule of former section 357 arguably represented a legitimate response to related-party transactions. By contrast, the expectation test
allows taxpayers to achieve the same result as in Lessinger and Peracchi by
merely agreeing to satisfy excess recourse liabilities at the outset. Perhaps ironically, the amended liability assumption rules are thus likely to make it easier to

'To preserve the character of built-in gain, the $50 gain should presumably be treated as attributable to Asset #1, the overencumbered asset. Because unencumbered Asset #2 is worth only $50, it is
economically unrealistic to allocate more than $50 of the excess recourse liability to Asset #2.
'See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
'"See Bogdanski, supra note 5, at 33.
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avoid section 357(c) gain when recourse liabilities are involved.
Simultaneously, Congress amended section 362 to prevent artificial inflation
of the transferee's basis in contributed property. Without section 362(d)(2), section 357(d) would be inadequate to prevent tax-indifferent parties from exploiting the flexible allocation rules for cross-collateralized nonrecourse liabilities.
Prior to the 1999 amendments, there was no statutory limitation on increasing
the basis of contributed property above fair market value as a result of section
357(c) gain. Congress never considered an alternative fair-market-value limitation modeled on section 752(c), which treats the transferee as assuming liabilities only to the extent of the fair market value of encumbered assets. While
section 362(d)(1) serves a similar goal of preventing basis inflation, the flawed
allocation method under the existing regulations is likely to have unintended
consequences in many nonabusive section 351 exchanges. A more sensible approach would allocate section 362 basis adjustments in accordance with unrealized appreciation inherent in contributed assets rather than fair market value.
Despite the parallel treatment of liabilities in connection with contributions
and distributions under pre-1999 law, Congress failed to extend the amended
liability assumption rules to corporate distributions. Treasury's extension of section 357(d) principles to section 301 distributions was motivated by tax-shelter
abuses. Logical consistency would seem, however, to require a uniform definition of assumption for purposes of both contributions and distributions. Although sections 311 (b)(2) and 336(b) treat a distribution of overencumbered
property as a deemed sale for an amount equal to the liabilities relieved, it is
unclear whether an asset-by-asset approach or an aggregate approach should be
applied. An aggregate approach is arguably more consistent with the goal of
General Utilities repeal because it corresponds more closely to an actual sale
when multiple assets are distributed. Coupled with an aggregate approach, extension of section 357(d) principles might effectively repeal sections 311 (b)(2)
and 336(b) with respect to most distributions of encumbered property.
The 1999 amendments illustrate the pitfalls of enacting targeted anti-abuse
measures with inadequate attention to the need for consistency and coherence
within a broader statutory framework. By responding to perceived abuses with
piecemeal, ad hoc legislation, Congress inevitably adds to the complexity of the
Code and potentially creates new loopholes.' 56 Before abandoning the relatively
simple deemed assumption rule of former section 357, Congress might have
heeded the lesson of the 1984 directive to revise the partnership liability-sharing
rules to more accurately reflect economic reality. 5 7 Rather than embodying a
serious analysis of economic risk, the sophisticated but highly artificial section
"'56Congress continues to tinker with the liability assumption rules. See Pub. L. 106-554, § 309,
114 Stat. 2763A-638 (2000) (enacting section 358(h)). To prevent duplication of built-in losses,
section 358(h) requires the basis of the transferor's stock to be stepped down to fair market value to
reflect certain deductible liabilities. See also I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001 I.R.B. 730 (disallowing
built-in losses in abusive transactions prior to enactment of section 358(h)).
57
' See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984, 250-51 (Comm. Print 1984).
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752 regulations allocate liabilities based on a hypothetical liquidation in which
all partnership assets become worthless and all partners are presumed to satisfy
their obligations.'58 As subchapter K demonstrates, the illusion of economic
reality may prove a disappointing substitute for administratively workable rules.

' 58See Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (constructive liquidation based on worst-case scenario); § 1.752l(b)(6) (deemed-satisfaction rule). See generally Stephen G. Utz, PartnershipTaxation in Transition: Of Form, Substance,and Economic Risk, 43 TAX LAW. 693, 714 (1990) (describing the regulatory
emphasis on economic risk as "quite disingenuous").
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